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This thesis approaches the question of 'How much testing is enough?" by
formulating a model for the combat situation in which the weapon (e.g., missile) will be
used. Methods of Bayesian statistics are employed to allow the decision maker to benefit
from prior information gained in the testing of similar systems by forecasting the
operational gain from acceptance. A Microsoft Excel V7.0 spreadsheet serves as the user
interface, and Visual Basic for Applications, Excel 's built in macro-language, is the
language used to produce the source code. The methodology accommodates two different
tactical usages for the missile: a single shot, or a salvo of two shots. The missile might be
acceptable if used in the two-shot salvo mode, but not in the single shot mode, and this
would imply a greater cost per mission. In the end the missile might not be judged cost-
effective as compared to a competitive system. If the model proposed is (or can become)
adequate much can be calculated/estimated before any operational tests are made. This
could assist in economizing on operational testing.
VI
THESIS DISCLAIMER
The reader is cautioned that models and computer programs developed in this
research may not have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every effort has been
made, within the time available, to ensure that the models provide accurate results and the
programs are free of computational and logic errors, they must be further validated and
verified. The completion of these tasks is left for further research. Any application of
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As a result of the end of the Cold War, the size and structure of the United States
military continues to undergo serious scrutiny. Although this is a dynamic process, the
exact outcome of which is unknown, it is clear that in the future there will be significant
reductions and changes in force structure, and a subsequent decrease in requirements for
the generation of large numbers of new weapon systems.
This trend will impact Testing and Evaluation programs, in that fewer dollars will
be allocated for the test and evaluation infrastructure and process. As with other aspects
of the acquisition process, the amount of testing performed should be determined by a
cost-effectiveness measure. This can be described as a balance between the expense of
testing and the reduction in risk for fielding the system gained by testing. One of the more
expensive components of weapon system testing is that which involves destructive testing
such as firing missiles or detonating ordinance. Such actions are required to provide some
verification of the systems' operational effectiveness and reliability. The need for testing
in an operational environment adds further to the expense and complexity of the system
evaluation. Clearly, testing methods which balance the need for economical efficiency and
statistical integrity must be explored in order for the war fighter to continue to receive
systems that are both effective and suitable, with firm attention to cost and value added.
This thesis presents a formal analytical process for arriving at a number, t*, of
missiles (or other expendable items) to test out of a finite lot or 'buy" of m. It does so by
estimating the operational combat utility of the missile, given acceptance. This means that
testing focuses on adding operational value, rather than on simply reducing uncertainty, as
simple hypothesis testing procedures tend to do. The methodology accommodates two
different tactical usages for the missile: a single shot, or a salvo of two shots. The missile
might be acceptable if used in the two-shot salvo mode, but not in the single shot mode,
and this would imply a greater cost per mission. In the end the missile might not be
judged cost-effective as compared to a competitive system. If the model proposed is (or
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can become) adequate much can be calculated/estimated before any operational tests are
riade. This could assist in economizing on operational testing.
The method proposed here is a suggestion and an approach; it is not a finished
product. Various questions must be answered before the approach is practical. For
example: how does one specify the prior (parameters) and the probability of successful
opponent retaliation? Answer: from organizational experience with analogous systems,
and from distilled expert judgment. Also, what to do with a system that is rejected (after
testing an appropriate number of times and getting fewer than minimum number of
successes)? The model does not attempt to address the choice of whether to end the
program, or to look for particular faults that caused the deficiency and attempt to correct
them. This choice is situation-specific, but if the system capability is needed and the faults
are identifiable and rectifiable at reasonable cost then the latter course is attractive.
Careful retrospective analysis of the test conditions is always important, whatever the
outcome.
In summary it is argued that some organized and defensible test planning and
decision aiding process is needed by the Operational Testing community. The present




As a result of the end of the Cold War, the size and structure of the United States
military continues to undergo serious scrutiny. Although this is a dynamic process, the
exact outcome of which is unknown, it is clear that in the future there will be significant
reductions and changes in force structure, and a subsequent decrease in requirements for
the generation of large numbers of new weapon systems.
This trend will impact Testing and Evaluation programs, in that fewer dollars will
be allocated for the test and evaluation infrastructure and process. As with other aspects
of the acquisition process, the amount of testing performed should be determined by a
cost-effectiveness measure. This can be described as a balance between the expense of
testing and the reduction in risk for fielding the system gained by testing. One of the more
expensive components of weapon system testing is that which involves destructive testing
such as firing missiles or detonating ordinance. Such actions are required to provide some
verification of the systems' operational effectiveness and reliability. The need for testing
in an operational environment adds further to the expense and complexity of the system
evaluation. Clearly, testing methods which balance the need for economical efficiency and
statistical integrity must be explored in order for the war fighter to continue to receive
systems that are both effective and suitable, with firm attention to cost and value added.
B. CURRENT THINKING CONCERNING UNCERTAINTY
When a test is designed it is set up to answer a decision maker's question such as,
'How good is this?" or 'Is it better than the one we have?" The challenge for the test
designer is to translate these questions into something that is testable. Typically this
translation results in statistical hypothesis testing. A key consideration in this type of
testing is the fact that the statistician will never tell you that the hypothesis has been
proven correct. He will only tell you whether or not it has been rejected. That is to say,
statistical hypothesis testing can lead to only two outcomes: the hypothesis is rejected, or
the hypothesis cannot be rejected. Statistical hypothesis testing never directly confirms the
hypothesis being tested. It is evident that the formulation or wording of the hypothesis is
critical to the information the testing produces. Furthermore, conventionally applied
hypothesis testing does not take into account gains from making correct decisions, or
losses from making incorrect ones.
Statistical hypothesis testing has another unattractive quality in these days of
shrinking budgets in that it does not allow the tester to take advantage of prior
knowledge. Only the data gathered in the context of the particular test formally qualifies
for analysis. Information available from other resources such as developmental testing,
testing of similar systems, field experience and the like are formally disregarded. The
reason this could be unattractive in today's fiscal environment is obvious. Information
gained from another similar system's testing process may remove the need for at least a
portion of testing of the new system and thereby conserve the relevant funds.
C. ALTERNATIVE THINKING
Bayes' theorem gives a probabilistically-based rule for updating the degree of
belief in a hypothesis H (i.e., the probability of H) given additional evidence E and
background information (context) I:
, > p(h|i}p{e|h,i}
Note that all the probabilities are conditional. They specify the degree of our belief in
some proposition under the assumption that some other propositions are true. This would
seem to imply that Bayesian methods require the addition of more assumptions to obtain
results, which is true. The most important assumption made is that of the value of the
'prior," the P{H|I} term in the equation above. Here lies the rub. Prior probabilities have
been not only ignored but abhorred by some classical statisticians. This has been due
chiefly to the frequently subjective nature of the prior probabilities. In practice there may
well be sufficient domain knowledge to specify a prior. In general, prior probabilities can
be assigned to any unknown parameters involved in a formulation. After additional data is
obtained these priors can be updated to a posterior. Clearly, Bayesian methods can take
advantage of knowledge from other sources that is relevant to the testing, and thereby
potentially save cost and time during the test and evaluation phase of system acquisition.
D. THESIS OBJECTIVE
This thesis employs a Bayesian framework in order to address a simplified version
of a decision problem in destructive testing. It approaches the question of 'How much
testing is enough?" by formulating a model for the combat situation in which the weapon
(e.g., missile) will be used. It then employs sequential Bayesian thinking to infer the
testing level needed to achieve optimal expected gain. Questions of risk are also
addressed.

H. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND SOLUTIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
A new system is proposed for acquisition, possibly to replace or upgrade an
existing system. This new system will be accepted provided it meets minimum
requirements for effectiveness and suitability which will be demonstrated through testing.
This testing will be performed to replicate the mission and environment to which the
system is expected to be exposed, and the results of a single test will be binary: success or
failure. For the purposes of this discussion we assume the system is a missile and that the
testing is destructive. That is to say, the test will destroy the missile but the record of its
performance will be retained.
We begin with m missiles which arrive as a lot and some number, t (0<t<m), of
them which are to be tested to determine whether or not the lot will be accepted. An
optimization problem presents itself. If a small number of missiles (2 for example) are
tested, less information is gained but a larger number of missiles is available to the fleet for
use, given that the lot is accepted. Conversely, if a large number of missiles (m-2 for
example) is tested, much more information is gained but only a few of the weapons are
available for the missions for which they were designed (in this case, only 2). The
intention of this paper is to provide a formulation that links the information gained from
testing to the effect that gathering that information has on the missile's future
performance. In addition, the possibility of informing the decision as to how the missile
could be "best" employed, or the choice of a shooting policy, will be discussed.
B. UNCERTAINTY AND OPERATIONAL GAIN
Assume that each of the missiles has the same, constant, and unknown probability
of success, p. The decision as to whether or not the missiles should be deployed to the
fleet will be based on the value of p. An option is to take t of the m missiles and test them.
The number of tests could range from to m; the latter would of course result in perfect
knowledge for the lot of missiles but would leave no weapons for the fleet to employ.
Models can be built to represent the missile as it would be used operationally. For
example: when the weapon is launched at an opponent he may, if he is missed, return fire
with a weapon of his own. Let vw be the value of a win, meaning a weapon hit on the
enemy and Vj be the value of a loss, a weapon hit by the enemy; q is the probability that the
enemy will have a successful counterfire given missile miss. For simplicity, assume the
value of q is known. The resulting gain function is, after t tests,
G1(p,t;m) = (m-t)[vwp-v 1 (l-p)q] (2.1)
and represents the total expected gain from fielding a missile with success probability p
determined from t tests which leaves (m-t) possible engagements. The subscript on Gi
indicates that one weapon at a time was fired at the enemy. A second model, that









Where |_xj denotes the largest integer less than or equal to x. We use the approximation
in the thesis. Note that a shoot-look-shoot policy is not evaluated here. The latter, while
possibly more economical of fielded missile inventory, may well increase the chance of
successful counterfire by the opponent (a larger q value).
C. THE DECISION RULE
1. Probability of Success Known
If the decision maker knows the value of p he might then opt not to test, meaning
that t=0. He would then evaluate G,(p, 0; m): if the result is sufficiently positive,
(exceeds a gain threshold), he accepts the system and fields it, while if the result is not
sufficiently positive he rejects the system, achieving a gain of zero. The acceptance gain
threshold may be defined by a predetermined minimum value of gain or by a minimum
improvement in gain relative to a preceding system. This use of gain functions is of course
quite simplified but serves the purpose of illustrating the method and provoking further
thought. In any case the decision whether or not to accept a system reduces to whether or
not the system's probability of success, p, meets or exceeds some minimum threshold, p .
For example, in the case of the gain function for Gi, it can be seen that in order for the
system to have positive gain, we must have a p-value that exceeds p = v,q / (vw + v,q).
2. Uncertainty in p: Bayesian Approach to Acceptance, Given a Test
The decision to test t leads to the acquisition of data which is assumed to be
summarized entirely as s successes (s = 0, 1, 2, . .., t) . These data can now be used in the
development of a likelihood for p by use of a binomial model, and, if p has a beta prior, a







where a' = a + s and P' = |3 + 1 - s . The values (a, P) characterize the prior density for
p. This is the classical conjugate prior setup which is standard; see Appendix A for details
of the derivation. If more investigation shows that an alternative prior is more appropriate
it is straightforward to supply the necessary changes. Now a decision maker in possession
of the posterior, equation (2.3), should use it to evaluate the expected gain. This is
accomplished by computing the gain's expected value with respect to the posterior
probability distribution, equation (2.3). In the case of Gi, the expectation is linear and of
the form,
E[G
1(ft^m)|M] = (m-t)[vwE[ii|M]-v1(l-E[p|^t])q], (2.4)
representing the expected gain from a fielded system. An appropriate decision rule for this
case is to field the system if E[G,(p,t;m)|s,tl is positive; otherwise 'reject" the system
This is mathematically equivalent to fielding the system if EKj^p^m^Sjtl > g, where
g might represent the gain from utilizing an alternative system. Because of the form of Gi
this is also equivalent to fielding the system if s(t) > s(t) where s(t) represents the
minimum number of successes out of t tests which results in a positive value for G\ (or a
value of g > 0). The derivation of s(t) for both the single-weapon and two-weapon salvo
cases can be found in Appendix B.
D. HOW MUCH TO TEST
1. Single-Weapon Case
The previous section indicates what decision to make given the test extent, t, and
the number of resultant successes, s(t). Now take the position of the decision maker
before any destructive testing is performed. He must consider testing to any level. That is
to say, he must consider testing 1, 2, 3, up to m missiles and determining which of the
values for t provides the best potential for gain from the remaining missiles. Of course the
results of the testing must satisfy the decision rules previously stated for the system to be
fielded. The prediction used depends on the binomial model and upon the prior, which is
assumed to be the beta prior with parameters a and (3:
n(p) = B(a,p)pa




P{s(t) = s|p,t) = Qjp
s(l-p) t_S
,
0< s < t. (2.6)
In order to predict s(t) simply remove the condition on p, using the prior; this encapsulates
the decision maker's uncertain knowledge at the time he must decide on t. Details are
found in Appendix A. The resultant predictive distribution, b(s;t), is the beta-binomial
b(s;t)sp{s(t) = dt}= T^-^r w o , (2.7)
Now the expectation of gain, E[Gi], depends on the value of s(t), which is unknown
during the planning phase of the test but whose probability distribution is given by
equation (2.7), a beta-binomial. Consequently, the value of future gain can be predicted
by unconditioning on s:
E{E[G
I
(p,t;m)|s,t]} = (m-t) (vw +v,q)£ xb(x;t)-v,q ]Tb(x;t)
x>s(t) xfes(t)
This expected gain can be evaluated over the entire range oft in principle.
(2.8)
2. Two-Weapon Salvo Case
Maintaining the aforementioned position of the decision maker and the questions
facing him, we address the case in which 2 weapons are fired sequentially with no delay
between shots. The beta prior, equation (2.5) and predictive distribution for s(t), equation
(2.7), remain unaltered from the single weapon case. Thus, the expectation of G2 also
depends on the value of s(t) and can be predicted by calculating
E{E[G
2






The derivation of s(t)can be found in Appendix B. This expected gain can also be
evaluated over the entire range of t and consideration should be given to starting with
small values oft and proceeding as in the single weapon case.
E. RISK OF ACCEPTANCE
The value oft, denoted by t*, which results in the maximum value of the predicted
gain is determined by numerical search as described previously. Given that during the
testing at least s(t) successes were observed and that the system was subsequently
accepted, we are now interested in the risk associated with this acceptance. Two possible
measures of this risk are (a) the predicted probability of kill per engagement (e.g., a
successful engagement), and (b) the probability that the number of mission engagements
result in fewer successes than some threshold, D. Such information supplements that
given by the expected value of gain, which involves not just p but also the chosen costs or
penalties vw , vi, and q.
1. Single-Weapon Case
The predicted probability of kill per engagement given acceptance of the system
emerges from the now familiar beta-binomial distribution, conditional on acceptance of the








Let M(t) be the number of successful engagements from utilizing the m-t missiles
in combat. The probability that M(t) will fall short of some minimum standard, D, for kills




k = 0,1,2,..., m-t. (2.11)
Next, remove the condition on p using the beta posterior:
-t] T(a+p+t) r(a+s+k)r(p-s+m-k)
P{M(t) = k|s} =
m
k J r(a+s)r(p+t-sj rfa+p+ml
and the condition on s, given acceptance, yields after simplification,

















Now the above, (2. 14), can be evaluated at t = t* for various D-values. It may be judged
that the probability of mission success is simply intolerably low despite the fact that
expected gain is positive. In that case the acceptance criterion, s(t), may be adjusted, and
attempts made to increase the intrinsic capability of the new missile system, which could
encompass performance as well as tactical considerations.
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2. Two-Weapon Salvo Case
In this case the probability of kill per engagement is found by first deriving the




This expected probability of failure is found in a similar fashion to that of
the expected probability of success using the beta posterior, described in the single-
weapon case. The expected posterior probability of success is then E 1 - (l - p)" . Details
are available in Appendix A. The predicted probability of kill per engagement, like the
single-weapon case, is conditional on acceptance of the system, s(t) > s(t) and with the









Let M(t) be the number of successful engagements from utilizing the m-t missiles
in combat. Since the missiles will be expended in pairs, let N(m,t) represent the maximum
number of possible engagements with the missiles that remain after testing which is given





M(t) will fall short of some minimum standard, D, for kills can also be found in terms of a
binomial:
p{M(t) = k|p,s(t)} =(^ (2.16)
Removing the condition on p using the beta posterior (2.7) and the binomial theorem (See
Appendix C),
P{M(t) = k|s} =
(2.17)
'N(m,tj^*fkY Tfa+p+t) rf2N(m,t)-2k+2n+p+t-s)
v k J^LJ'~^ T(p+t-s) r(2N(m,t)-2k+2n+a+p+t)'
and the condition on s yields after simplification,
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p{M(t) = k| Acceptance} =
j2s(t)n=(A.K V
N(m,t)VkV r(a+j)r(2N(m,t)-2k+2n+p+t-j







PJM(t) < D|Acceptance} = X P {M (t) = k|Acceptance} (2.19)
k =
As with the single-weapon case, the above, (2.19), can be evaluated at t = t* for
various D-values. It may be judged that the probability of mission success is simply
unacceptably low despite the fact that expected gain is positive. In that case the
acceptance criterion, s(t) may be adjusted, and attempts made to increase the intrinsic





Consider a lot of 30 missiles offered by a manufacturer who has performed
developmental testing and is satisfied that the uncertainty in each missile's kill probability
per engagement can be described by a beta distribution with parameters a and (3, equal to
5 and 1 respectively. We assume (2.1) adequately models the system in its combat
environment and that an expected gain of or greater is sufficient for acceptance although
a gain of might indicate no improvement over a current system. We further assume the
values for vw, vi, and q are known to be 1, 5, and 0.75. The 1 and 5 serve to indicate that
the (negative) value of losing one of our aircraft is 5 times that of causing the destruction
of one of the opponent's aircraft. The 0.75 indicates that if the enemy has opportunity to
counterfire he will with 0.75 probability succeed in shooting down our aircraft.
B. THE ACCEPTANCE POLICY
Accepting the system based upon a minimum expected gain is mathematically
equivalent to accepting the system if s(t) > s(t) . The value of s(t) is found by evaluating
(B.6):





Negative values of s(t)are set equal to while all other values are rounded up to the
nearest integer. This is consistent with both the idea that only non-negative numbers of
successes can be observed and that s(t) is to provide a lower bound on acceptable gain
which is itself restricted to values greater than or equal to 0.
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Next s(t)and (2.7) are used to evaluate the predicted expected gain given by (2.8)




(p,t;m)|s(t),t|Acceptance} = (m-t) (vw +v,q)X xb(x;t)-v,q£b(x;t)
x>s(t)
= (30-t) (4.75) X 5x
r(5+x)r(i+t+x)





Relevant values oft, s(t) , and predicted gain can be seen in Table 3.1. If the predicted
gain were determined to be zero through the range oft, the system would be rejected
without testing since there is at best no gain from the testing expenditure. Also, if the
maximum expected gain is achieved with no testing, t = 0, then the evaluation of the risk
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
s(t) 1 2 3 3 4 5 6
E[G,] 6.25 7.77 8.13 7.97 7.94 8.05 7.95 7.72
Table 3.1. Example Results.
associated with deployment of the system becomes more significant. Neither of these
situations occur in this example. In this example maximum expected gain occurs when 2
of the 30 missiles are tested and the remaining 28 missiles are deployed. The policy is to
accept the missile if both of the tests are successful. It is noticeable that the expected gain
has a somewhat flat or slowly-changing dependence on t, so a judgment that a few more
tests are desirable, based on unmodeled considerations, does not incur a great change in
expected gain. Extra tests might be conducted to reveal surprising system faults.
Additional testing under different tactical conditions may very well be necessary.
C. RISK ASSESSMENT
We are now interested in the risk associated with acceptance of the missile system
subsequent to observing at least s(t) successes during testing. The first measure of risk
14
considered is the predicted probability of kill per engagement given acceptance which can
be obtained from (2.10) in concert with (2.7). The same numerical example is used for
illustration.
?«=
V f_S±x_Wt) ^5 + ^2^(6) r(5 + x)r(3 + x)
x>s(t)






The second measure of risk considers the probability that the number of mission
engagements result in fewer successes than some threshold, D given acceptance. This step
is accomplished by evaluating (2.13)
T(a+p+t) X r(a+j+k)rfp-j+m-k)













then simply sum the results for the cumulative distribution up to D. Table 3.2 contains an
D 1 2 3 4 12 13 14 15 24 25 26 27 28
P{M=D}
.002 .004 .006 .008 .088 .109 .135 .165 .2
P{M<D}
.007 .012 .017 .025 .391 .501 .635 .8 1
Table 3.2. Risk Summary.
illustrative portion of the results for this example. In this example there is a 50%
probability of 25 or fewer successes out of 28, or a 50% chance of 25 or more successes
out of 28. Such information enhances the decision maker's intuition.
15
D. SUMMARY
The example above demonstrates a formulation that links the information gained
from testing to the effect that testing has on a particular measure of the performance of the
system once fielded. Despite the fact that the example is simple, valuable information is
gleaned from it. In this example some guidance is provided to an individual who might be
deciding just how many of the 30 available missiles should be tested. While testing 2 of
the 30 missiles may not be the answer, if one places some belief in the assumptions made
at the beginning of the exercise it is apparent that the number to test is nearer 2 than a
considerably larger number, such as 15. Furthermore, the expense has been minimal
compared to that of expending weaponry under one set of tactical conditions. Additional
missile testing under different conditions is needed to explore the range of possible combat
environments, so it may be reassuring that a comparatively few tests are recommended for




The methods developed in previous chapters are, even for the simplest cases,
computationally tedious. This invites one to use a computer not only for the convenience
but also for the speed. Convenience is lost to some degree when one must learn a
programming language in order execute the type of calculations involved in this
formulation. On the other hand, more and more people are becoming familiar with
spreadsheets and their use, especially in the analytical community. Increasingly,
spreadsheets available commercially are suitable for situations that once required a custom
program written in a traditional programming language. One such spreadsheet is
Microsoft's Excel V7.0. Excel and its accompanying macro language
,
Visual Basic for
Applications, were used in the production of this project's software. The code for this
application is located in Appendix D. The 'readme.txt" help file and software installation
directions are located in Appendix E.
B. OVERVIEW
1. Input
The user is presented with a window which prompts him for the necessary
information (See Figure 4.1). The inputs for both the single-weapon and two-weapon
salvo cases are handled in an identical manner. Default values are indicated with the
purpose of avoiding program crashes caused by blank input fields. Once the user is
satisfied with his input selection, he merely clicks the 'Begin" button or presses the return
key on his keyboard to initiate the computations.
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Enter Appropriate Values in Boxes and Piess Begin















After the user initiates the computations and the algorithm has executed, a
spreadsheet page is produced. The worksheet contains a plot of the predicted gain values
over the range of t (Figure 4.2) and several tables. The tables display information
regarding the relationship between t, E[Gi], and s(t); the optimal number of missiles to
test, t*; and the values associated with the risk incurred if the system is fielded.
A I B I C | D I E I F I G I H I I J I K | L I M N








Expected "S ngle-Shot Engagement" Gain after Testing
5 3 Z5 3 2 5 j ^ — «
6 4 2.444444 4
7 5 2.272727 5
8 6 2.045455 5
9 7 1.958042 6 5 f
10 8 1 794872 7 v 1
11 9 1 582418 8 i 1
12 10 1 339286 9 » 'T /
13 11 1078431 10 UJ /
14 12 808824 10 0.5+ /














vw v, q a p m k P{M=k} PfM^k) p bartt)15 15 1 15 794E-06 7 94E-06 888889
22 1 6 35E-05 7 14E-05
23 2 0.000286 3 57E-04
24 Max Gain : 2.50 3 000953 131E-03
25 Optimal t 3 4 00262 393E-03
26 Minimum required successes 3 5 006287 102E-02
27 6 0013622 238E-02
28 7 0.027245 511E-02
29 8 0051084 102E-01
30 9 090815 193E-01
31 10 154386 3.47E-01
32 11 252632 6 00E-01
33 12 4 100E+00
34
Figure 4.2. Typical Output Worksheet.
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C. DEMONSTRATION
The following serve to demonstrate the scope of this project's software through
various combinations of weapon cases and analysis outcomes. Although the combinations
are not exhaustive, they illustrate sufficiently to express the breadth of outcome
possibilities.
1. Single-Weapon Case with Testing Recommended
Consider a lot of 15 missiles whose prior probability of kill has a beta distribution
with parameters a and (3, equal to 5 and 1 respectively (Figure 4.2). The values of vw , vi
and q are 1, 5, and 1 respectively. The values used for the other relevant parameters are
displayed in the output worksheet for convenience. The algorithm finds that maximum
gain is achieved when 3 missiles are tested and an acceptance policy of 3 successes from 3
trials is employed. See Figure 4.2 for these results as well as the risk of acceptance
predictions.
2. Two-Weapon Salvo Case with No Testing Recommended
Consider a lot of 15 missiles whose prior probability of kill has a beta distribution
with parameters a and (3, equal to 5 and 1 respectively (Figure 4.3). The values of vw , vj
and q are 1, 5, and 1 respectively. The values used for the other relevant parameters are
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Figure 4.3. Two-Weapon Salvo Case with No Testing Recommended.
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displayed in the output worksheet for convenience. Note that the cost values are the same
as those in Figure 4.2. However this case envolves consideration for the two-weapon
salvo where the penalty for accepting a system with a low value of p is small.
Subsequently, the algorithm finds that maximum gain is achieved when missiles are
tested and suggests system acceptance without testing (it is likely that this would be
overridden in practice). In this case the risk of acceptance analysis is particularly germane.
See Figure 4.3 for these results.
3. Single-Weapon Case with System Rejection
Consider a lot of 1 5 missiles whose prior probability of kill has a beta distribution
with parameters a and |3, equal to 5 and 1 respectively (Figure 4.4). The values of vw , vj
and q are 1, 25, and 1 respectively. The values used for the other relevant parameters are
displayed in the output worksheet for convenience. The algorithm finds that maximum
gain that could be achieved is no better than that gain which exists without the missile
system being considered and suggests system rejection without testing. In this case the
cost of loss is vi = 25 as compared to vi = 5 in Figure 4.3. Acceptance of this system
A B C DEFG H I JKLM N






Expected "Single-Shot Engagement" Gain after Testing























12 10 S. 0.4 -
13 11 " 0.3-
14 12 0.2 -











vw v, q a p m k P{M=k} P{M s k) p bar(t)
1 25 1 5 1 15 REJECT SYSTEM
22
23
24 Max Gain 0.00
25 Optimal t:
26 Minimum required successes NA
.22.
Figure 4.4. Single-Weapon Case with System Rejection.
would result in gain which is at best zero and probably negative. In other words,
acceptance of the system will place the decision maker in no better a position. See Figure
4.4 for these results.
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4. Two-Weapon Salvo Case with Testing Recommended
Consider a lot of 1 5 missiles whose probability of kill has a beta distribution with
parameters a and (3, equal to 5 and 1 respectively (Figure 4.5). The values of vw , vi and q
are 1, 35, and 1 respectively. The values used for the other relevant parameters are
displayed in the output worksheet for convenience. Note that testing is recommended
here (accepting the system if 5 successes are observed in 5 tests) while testing is not
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Expected "2 Weapon Salvo" Gain after Testing
5 3 0.75 3
6 4 1.055556 4 1-2 T
7 5 1.136364 5
8 6 1 101399 6
9 7 1 007326 7 c*0.8
10 8 0884615 8 a








14 12 470201 11 0.2













vw v, q a p m k P{M=k} P{M<k} pbar(t)
1 35 1 5 1 15 5 41E-06 5 41E-06 984848
22 1 8 72E-05 9.26E-05
23 2 0.000846 9.38E-04
24 Max Gain : 1 14 3 0.006875 7 81E-03
25 Optimal t 5 4 0059094 6.69E-02
26 Minimum required successes 5 5 0.933093 100E+00
U
Figure 4.5. Two-Weapon Salvo Case with Testing Recommended.
5 in Figure 4.3. It is reasonable that more care be taken in the present more costly case:
the penalty for accepting a low value of p is much greater here than in the case of Figure
4.3. The algorithm finds that maximum gain is achieved when 5 missiles are tested and an
acceptance policy of 5 successes from 5 trials is employed. See Figure 4.5 for these




This thesis presents a formal analytical process for arriving at a number, t*, of
missiles (or other expendable items) to test out of a finite lot or 'buy" of m. It does so by
estimating the operational combat utility , called gain , of the missile, given acceptance.
This means that testing focuses on adding operational value, rather than on simply
reducing uncertainty, as simple hypothesis testing procedures tend to do. The
methodology accommodates two different tactical usages for the missile: a single shot, or
a salvo of two shots. The missile might be acceptable if used in the two-shot salvo mode,
but not in the single shot mode, and this would imply a greater cost per mission. In the
end the missile might not be judged cost-effective as compared to a competitive system. If
the model proposed is (or can become) adequate much can be calculated/estimated before
any operational tests are made. This could assist in economizing on operational testing.
The method proposed here is a suggestion and an approach; it is not a finished
product. Various questions must be answered before the approach is practical. For
example: how does one specify the prior (parameters) and the probability of successful
opponent retaliation? Answer: from organizational experience with analogous systems,
and from distilled expert judgment. Also, what to do with a system that is rejected (after
testing t* times and getting fewer than s(t*) successes)? The model does not attempt to
address the choice of whether to end the program, or to look for particular faults that
caused the deficiency and attempt to correct them. This choice is situation-specific, but if
the system capability is needed and the faults are identifiable and rectifiable at reasonable
cost then the latter course is attractive. Careful retrospective analysis of the test
conditions is always important, whatever the outcome.
In summary it is argued that some organized and defensible test planning and
decision aiding process is needed by the OT test community. The present approach is a
proposed step on the path to filling that need.
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APPENDIX A. BINOMIAL BAYES
The probability of a number of successes given a fixed number of trials is
calculated using the binomial distribution. The usual parameters are n, the number of
trials; s, the number of successes in n trials; and p, the probability of success for any of the
single trials. In the case of the beta-binomial distribution the parameter p is assumed to be
random having a beta distribution. After n trials have been executed determining s, the
Bayes update of the beta prior for p is possible.
A. THE BETA POSTERIOR




rSf§j P°"^ -")'"• 0Sp<l;0<cc;0<p, (A.1)





The Bayes posterior is found by multiplying the prior for p by the likelihood and
normalizing
("U-pry-'O-pf
n(p|n,s,a,p) = T7^ (A.3a)
/["Jp-O-pry-'O-pf'dp





Also, since the density must integrate to 1,
r(q + p + n)
r(a + s)r(p + n-s)
Then, the beta posterior mean for p is
E[p;«.PIs,n] =^^. (A.5)
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2 |n,s] = B(a\P')JO - p)V '"'(I - pf-'dp (A.6a)
E[c - p)>> s] = f^y/p""^ 1 - p)
B""
dP (A 6b>
where a' = a + s and |3' = (3 + 1 - s. Finally, the mean beta posterior is
E[(l-p)'H= .(P





L J (a + p + n + l)(a + p + n)
B. THE PREDICTIVE DISTRIBUTION FOR THE NUMBER OF
SUCCESSES
This derivation takes advantage of the beta prior for p in the development of a
predictive distribution for the number of successes, s, in t trials. A binomial model that
utilizes the beta prior, (A. 1), and that is conditional on p is formed




Removing the condition on p yields
p{ S(t)H<HQpii-pr^p-'(i-pfv (a.9)
Let a' = a + sand P' = P + 1 - s and combine terms to obtain
^-^Q^f&W-^* (Al0)
and simplify to get
Pis(t) - 4t\ - f
tU(a + P)r(a + s)r(p + t-s)
[[) " W ' UJ r(a)r(p) r(a + p + t) (A. 11)
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APPENDIX B. DERIVATION OF MINIMUM SUCCESS THRESHOLD
This appendix describes and then derives an expression for s(t), the minimum
number of successes needed during testing in order to accept the system being tested.
A. INTRODUCTION
Consider a decision policy in which a system must provide a minimum level of gain
from testing and subsequent fielding, given that the system is accepted. Let this minimum
gain be g. Because of the form of the gain functions, (2.1) and (2.2), used in this paper
acceptance of the system based on observing at least a minimum number of successes
during testing, s(t), is mathematically equivalent to acceptance of the system based on
receiving a minimum gain, g.
B. DERIVATION OF s(t)
1. Single-Weapon Case
For ease of discussion, a gain of has been deemed the minimum value of gain
which allows system acceptance in this paper,
EfG^tjmKtXtJJ^O. (B.l)
From (2.4) it is evident that
(m - t)[vw E[p|<t),t] - v,q(l - E[p|s(t),t])] > (B.2)
implies that
Efp|s(t),t]>^^_. (B.3)





a + (3 + t v w +v,q
and solving for s(t) gives
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s(t)>
v,q(a + p + t)
-a.
Vw+V!q
Since s(t) > s(t) for non-negative gain it follows that
v,q(q + p + t)
vw+v,q
where |~z] is the smallest non-negative integer greater than or equal to z.
(B.5)
-<t) -a (B6)
2. Two-Weapon Salvo Case
Again for ease of discussion, a gain of has been deemed to be in this paper, the
minimum value of gain which allows system acceptance.
E[G 2 (p,t;m|s(t),t)]>0. (B.7)





and substituting the beta posterior, (A. 7), yields for the bracketed term
>0.
, v (p + t-s + lXp + t-s)
v w -(vw+ v,q) ,(a + p + 1 + l)(a + P + 1)
(Note we are replacing
Let
m-t
in (2.2) with | ^—^ | .)
A =
vw (a + p + t+l)(a + P + t)
and let
Now rearrange (B.9) to obtain
vw + v,q





(p + r + l)(p + r) - A =
r
2
+(2p + l)r + (p
2 +p-A) = 0.
(B.12)
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The quadratic formula is now utilized to find the roots of (B.12). The root of









s(t) = max(t-[r*J,o) (B.14)
where [_xj is the largest integer less than or equal to x.
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APPENDIX C. BINOMIAL THEOREM APPLICATION
This appendix states the binomial theorem and discusses its application with regard
to the derivation of a formulation for risk assessment in the two-weapon salvo case.
A. THE BINOMIAL THEOREM
(* + y)
n
=Zr> ryn „r..n-r (C.l)
r=0
B. APPLICATION OF BINOMIAL THEOREM
Let M(t) be the number of successful engagements possible after t missiles have
been tested and let N(m,t) =
m-t
represent the largest integer less than
m-t
The
probability of k successes out of N(m, t) engagements conditional on p, the probability of
success for a single missile, and s, the number of successes during testing of t missiles is
given by















Removing the condition on p
(C.2)























N(m,t)| *|V\ T(a + p + t) r(a + s)r(2N(m, t) - 2k + 2n + (3 + 1 - s)
v k y^U/ ' T(a + s)r(P + t-s) r(2N(m,t)-2k + 2n + a + p + t-s)
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APPENDIX D. VISUAL BASIC FOR APPLICATIONS CODE
This appendix contains the Visual Basic for Applications code used in the spreadsheet
implementation software.
A. GLXLS, SINGLE WEAPON GAIN WORKBOOK
LT John R. Gorman
Spring 1997
Test Length Decision Analysis
Sub get_input()
This section gets input for vw, vl, q, a, b, & m. The main subroutine
is then called and executed.
Dim DBoxBegin As Boolean
DialogSheetsflnput Box").EditBoxes("input_vw").Text = "1"
DialogSheets("lnput Box"). EditBoxes("input_vl").Text = "5"
DialogSheets("lnput Box"). EditBoxes("input_q").Text = "1"
DialogSheetsflnput Box"). EditBoxes("input_a").Text = "5"
DialogSheets("lnput Box").EditBoxes("input_b").Text = "1"
DialogSheetsflnput Box").EditBoxes("input_m").Text = "15"
DBoxBegin = DialogSheets("lnput Box").Show



































Dim vw As Variant
Dim vl As Variant
Dim q As Variant
Dim a As Variant
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Dim b As Variant
Dim t As Variant
Dim s_bar As Variant
vw = Rangefvw").Value
vl = Rangefvl").Value















Fort = To m
Range(T). Select
ActiveCell.Offset(t, 0).Value = t
s_bar = Application.RoundUp(_




Forj = s_barTo t
bJ1 = Exp(Application.GammaLn(a + b)) * Exp(Application.GammaLn(a + j))
Exp(Application.Gammal_n(b + t - j))
bJ2 = Exp(Application.Gammal_n(a)) * Exp(Application.GammaLn(b)) *_
Exp(Application.Gammal_n(a + b + t))
bJ3 = Application.Combin(t, j)
bj = bJ1 / bJ2 * bJ3
EG1_1 = ((vw + vl * q) * (a + j) / (a + b + 1)) - (vl * q)
EG1 = EG1 + (EG1_1 * bj)
Next j
EG1 = Application.Max(EG1 * (m - 1), 0)
Range("E_G1"). Select
ActiveCell.Offset(t, 0).Value = EG1
ActiveCell.Offset(t, 1).Value = s_bar
Nextt
Dim check_range As Range
Dim optimal_t As Integer
Dim t_counter As Integer




Set check_range = Selection
Range("max_gain"). Select
ActiveCell.Value = Application. Max(check_range)
optimal_gain = Application. Max(check_range)
Range("E_G1 ").Activate
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For t_counter = 1 To m + 1
If ActiveCell.Value = optimal_gain Then







This routine calculates the risks associated with accepting the
'system after testing.
Dim k As Variant
Dim PM1 As Variant
Dim PM2 As Variant
Dim PM3 As Variant
Dim PM As Variant
Dim t_star As Variant
Dim m_t As Variant
Dim i As Variant
Dim p_bar As Variant
Dim p_bar1 As Variant
Dim p_bar2 As Variant
t_star= Range("t_star").Value
m_t = m - t_star
s_bar_star = Application. Max(
_
(Application. RoundUp((vl * q * (a + b + t_star)

















If ((t_star = 0) And Not (optimal_gain = 0)) Then
GoTo NoTest
Elself (optimal_gain = 0) Then
GoTo Reject
Else
For k = To m_t
PM2 =
PM3 =
PM1 = (Application.Combin(m_t, k) *_
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Exp(Application.GammaLn(a + b + t_star))) /_
Exp(Application.GammaLn(a + b + m))
For j = s_bar_star To t_star
PM2 = PM2 + ((Application. Combin(t_star, j) *_
Exp(Application.Gammal_n(a + j + k)) *_
Exp(Application.GammaLn(b - j + m - k))))
PM3 = PM3 + ((Application. Combin(t_star, j) *_
Exp(Application.GammaLn(a + j)) *_
Exp(Application.Gammal_n(b + t_star - j))))
Next j






For j = s_bar_star To t_star
p_bar1 = p_bar1 + (a + j) * ((Application.Combin(t_star, j) *_
Exp(Application.Gammal_n(a + j)) *_
Exp(Application.Gammal_n(b + t_star - j))))
p_bar2 = p_bar2 + ((Application. Combin(t_star, j) *_
Exp(Application.Gammal_n(a + j)) *
_
Exp(Application.Gammal_n(b + t_star - j))))
Next j








































ActiveCell.Value = a / (a + b)










This routine provides for the functions that occur on workbook opening.
Sub Auto_open()
Call get_input
ActiveWorkbook. Protect contents = True
End Sub
B. G2.XLS, TWO-WEAPON SALVO GAIN WORKBOOK
LT John R. Gorman
Spring 1997
Test Length Decision Analysis
Sub get_input()
This section gets input for vw, vl, q, a, b, & m. The main subroutine
is then called and executed.
Dim DBoxBegin As Boolean
DialogSheets("lnput Box"). EditBoxes("input_vw").Text = "1"
DialogSheetsflnput Box").EditBoxes("input_vl").Text = "15"
DialogSheetsflnput Box").EditBoxes("input_q").Text = "1"
DialogSheetsflnput Box"). EditBoxes("input_a").Text = "5"
DialogSheetsflnput Box").EditBoxes("input_b").Text = "1"
DialogSheetsflnput Box").EditBoxes("input_m").Text = "15"
DBoxBegin = DialogSheetsflnput Box").Show



























Dim li As Variant
Dim r2 As Variant
Dim r As Variant
Dim vw As Variant
Dim vl As Variant
Dim q As Variant
Dim a As Variant
Dim b As Variant
Dim t As Variant

















Fort = To m
Range(T). Select
ActiveCell.Offset(t, 0).Value = t
M = -b - 0.5 + 0.5 * (1 + ((4 * vw * (a + b + t + 1) * (a + b + t)) / (vw + vl * q))) A 0.5
r2 = -b - 0.5 - 0.5 * (1 + ((4 * vw * (a + b + t + 1) * (a + b + t)) / (vw + vl * q))) A 0.5
If ((r1 <= 0) And (r2 <= 0)) Then GoTo RejectJ
If (((r2 > 0) And (r1 > 0)) And (r1 > r2)) Then r = r1
If (((r2 > 0) And (r1 > 0)) And (r2 > r1)) Then r = r2
If ((r2 > 0) And (r1 <= 0)) Then r = r2
If ((r1 > 0) And (r2 <= 0)) Then r = r1
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s_bar = Application.Max(0, (t - Application. RoundDown(r, 0)))
EG2 =
For j = s_bar To t
bJ1 = Exp(Application.Gammal_n(a + b)) * Exp(Application.Gammal_n(a + j))
Exp(Application.GammaLn(b + t - j))
bJ2 = Exp(Application.GammaLn(a)) * Exp(Application.Gammal_n(b)) *_
Exp(Application.Gammal_n(a + b + t))
bJ3 = Application. Combin(t, j)
bj = bJ1 / bJ2 * bJ3
EG2_1 = vw - ((vw + vl * q) * (b + t - j + 1) * (b + t - j) _
/((a + b + t+ 1)*(a + b + t)))
EG2 = EG2 + (EG2_1 * bj)
Next j
EG2 = Application.Max(EG2 * (m - 1) / 2, 0)
Range("E_G2"). Select
ActiveCell. Offset(t, 0).Value = EG2





ActiveCel I. Offset (t, 1).Value =
next_t:
Nextt
Dim check_range As Range
Dim optimal_t As Integer
Dim t_counter As Integer




Set check_range = Selection
Range("max_gain"). Select
ActiveCell.Value = Application. Max(check_range)
optimal_gain = Application. Max(check_range)
Range("b2").Activate
For t_counter = 1 To m + 1
If ActiveCell.Value = optimal_gain Then







This routine calculates the risks associated with accepting the
'system after testing.
Dim t_star As Variant
Dim s_bar_star As Variant
Dim p_bar As Variant
Dim p_bar1 As Variant
Dim p_bar2 As Variant
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t_star = Range("t_star")Value
r1_star = -b - 0.5 + 0.5 * (1 + ((4 * vw * (a + b + t_star + 1) *
_
(a + b + t_star)) / (vw + vl * q))) A 0.5
r2_star = -b - 0.5 - 0.5 * (1 + ((4 * vw * (a + b + t + 1) *
_
(a + b + t)) / (vw + vl * q))) A 0.5
If (((r2_star > 0) And (r1_star > 0)) And (r1_star > r2_star)) Then r_star = r1_star
If (((r2_star > 0) And (r1_star > 0)) And (r2_star > r1_star)) Then r_star = r2_star
If ((r2_star > 0) And (r1_star <= 0)) Then r_star = r2_star
If ((r1_star > 0) And (r2_star <= 0)) Then r_star = r1_star
s_bar_star = Application. Max(0, (t_star - Application. RoundDown(r_star, 0)))
Range("s_bar_star").Value = s_bar_star
m_t = m - t_star

















If ((t_star = 0) And Not (optimal_gain = 0)) Then
GoTo NoTest
Elself (optimal_gain = 0) Then
GoTo Reject
Else
For k = To N_mt
PM1 =0
PM2 =
For j = s_bar_star To t_star
PM1a =
For n = To k




Exp(Application.GammaLn(a + j)) *_
Exp(Application.Gammal_n(2 * N_mt -2*k + 2*n + b + t_star - j)) /
_
Exp(Application.Gammal_n(2 * N_mt -2*k + 2*n + a + b + t_star)))
Next n
PM1 =PM1 +PM1a
PM2 = PM2 + ((Application. Combin(t_star, j)) *_
Exp(Application.GammaLn(b + t_star - j)) *
_
Exp(Application.GammaLn(a + j)) /
_
Exp(Application.Gammal_n(a + b + t_star)))
Next j
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For j = s_bar_star To t_star
p_bar1 = p_bar1 + ((1 - ((b + t_star - j + 1) * (b + t_star - j) /
.
((a + b + t_star + 1) * (a + b + t_star)))) *
_
Application. Combin(t_star, j) *_
Exp(Application.GammaLn(a + j)) *
_
Exp(Application.GammaLn(b + t_star - j)))
p_bar2 = p_bar2 + ((Application. Combin(t_star, j) *
_
Exp(Application.GammaLn(a + j)) *
_
Exp(Application.Gammal_n(b + t_star - j))))
Next j









For i = To m
ActiveCell. Offset(i, 0).Value = i


































ActiveCell. Offset(0, 1).Value = "<- Prior probability used since tested"
N_m = Application.RoundDown(m / 2, 0)
Rangefk"). Select





For j = s_bar_star To t_star
PM1a =
For n = To k




Exp(Application.GammaLn(a + j)) *_
Exp(Application.GammaLn(2 * N_mt -2*k + 2*n + b + t_star - j)) /
_
Exp(Application.GammaLn(2 * N_mt -2*k + 2*n + a + b + t_star)))
Next n
PM1 =PM1 + PM1a
PM2 = PM2 + ((Application. Combin(t_star, j)) *_
Exp(Application.Gammal_n(b + t_star - j)) *
_
Exp(Application.GammaLn(a + j)) / _
Exp(Application.Gammal_n(a + b + t_star)))
Next j







ActiveCell. FormulaR1C1 = "=RC[-1] M










For j = s_bar_star To t_star
p_bar1 = p_bar1 + ((1 - ((b + t_star - j + 1) * (b + t_star - j) /
_
((a + b + t_star + 1) * (a + b + t_star)))) *
_
Application. Combin(t_star, j) *_
Exp(Application.Gammal_n(a + j)) *_
Exp(Application.Gammal_n(b + t_star - j)))
p_bar2 = p_bar2 + ((Application. Combin(t_star, j) *_
Exp(Application.GammaLn(a + j)) *_
Exp(Application.Gammal_n(b + t_star - j))))
Next j














APPENDIX E. INSTALLATION INSTRUCTIONS
The installation diskette has the following three files:
1
.
Gl xls - the Excel workbook which contains the algorithm for analysis of
the single weapon case.
2. G2.xls - the Excel workbook which contains the algorithm for analysis of
the two-weapon salvo case.
3. Readme.txt - an ASCII text file which contains the text found in this
appendix.
To use the analysis files, simply open them with Excel V7.0 or later and follow the
dialog box prompts. Input parameters can be changed and the algorithm repeated by
clicking the button on the worksheet marked "Press to Change Parameters." The
workbooks open recommending a "read-only" format. This is done to protect the
structure of the "Results" worksheet. The worksheets which contain the input dialog box
and the source code are "hidden." The source code is also "protected" and cannot be
altered. If one wishes to alter the code to develop the ideas of the software further, cut
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